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Chapter 16
The Coevolution of Innovative Ties, Proximity, 
and Competencies: Toward a Dynamic 
Approach to Innovation Cooperation
Uwe Cantner, Susanne Hinzmann, and Tina Wolf
The growing complexity and shortening of cycles inherent in the innovation process 
have changed the industrial and technological environment in which firms operate. 
The associated increase in uncertainty and costs accompanying R&D projects has 
shaped a landscape that favors collaboration (Hagedoorn, 2002). Especially in high- 
tech industries, where knowledge creation and accumulation is a crucial input factor 
and competition has become a learning race, joint research has steadily grown since 
the 1980s (Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman, 1996; Powell, 1998).
A basic feature of joint research is the exchange and sharing of knowledge 
among the cooperation partners. Actors choose research cooperation in the expecta-
tion that it will maximize their potential gain in knowledge. In this context several 
scholars have stressed the importance that similarity between cooperation partners 
has for knowledge transfer and successful collaboration. Similarity determines with 
whom one connects, for it creates trust, facilitates knowledge flows, and increases 
the mutual attractiveness of potential collaboration partners (Boschma, 2005; 
McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001). Similarity or proximity in three dimen-
sions—cognitive, social, and competence-related—seems to play a cardinal role in 
knowledge exchange in collaborations intended to generate innovation.
These three dimensions are not simply exogenously given and static; they 
develop in the course of the partners’ collaboration. Continued collaboration even-
tually leads trust, experience, and common understanding to increase and knowl-
edge differences to decrease. These dynamics are expected to determine whether the 
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same partners always cooperate or whether they switch partners over time. 
Increasing trust, experience, and common understanding tend to contribute to the 
continuation of the partnership because they increase the efficiency of knowledge 
exchange and sharing. Conversely, the declining difference between knowledge 
stocks of continuously cooperating partners—that is, an increase in their cognitive 
proximity (the degree of similarity of their knowledge bases)—indicates that oppor-
tunities to exchange and share knowledge have been exploited by them and should 
therefore lead to partner-switching.
Hence, the relation between certain proximity dimensions and continuation of 
collaboration is by no means unidirectional (Ter Wal & Boschma, 2011). In fact, 
individual characteristics (e.g., technological capabilities), and thus the proximity to 
others, coevolve with continuous collaboration (Balland, Boschma, & Frenken, 2015; 
Ter Wal & Boschma, 2011). These dynamics have undergone little empirical analysis 
(Balland et al., 2015). Although the coevolution of factors driving collaboration choice 
and the evolution of ties can be explored only with a dynamic approach, most of the 
studies on the relation between proximity and cooperation have been rather static 
(e.g., Cantner & Meder, 2007; Paier & Scherngell, 2011; Wuyts et al., 2005).
In this chapter we want to contribute to the field of dynamic approaches and 
analyze the interplay between cognitive proximity, knowledge exchange, and col-
laboration. We focus our analysis on ties within innovator networks defined as an 
ensemble of direct and indirect connections, with the direct ones being research 
collaborations intended to produce innovations (Cantner & Graf, 2006). Tracking 
the individual actors and their collaborations over time, we pursue the following 
core research question: To what extent do knowledge dynamics between two coop-
erating actors determine the continuation of their innovative ties? Accordingly, we 
concentrate mainly on the dynamics of partners’ cognitive proximity. In addition, 
we analyze the other two dimensions, trust and competencies, as further important 
covariates.
Our descriptive analysis suggests that firms are generally prone to switching 
their cooperation partner rather than to repeating the collaboration with that partner. 
We thus find that the knowledge transfer and cooperation that partners have experi-
enced with each other have no significant effect on the likelihood that they will 
repeat their cooperation. Our empirical analysis also shows that cooperation is pro-
moted by several factors: an overlap between the firms’ knowledge bases, an uneven 
distribution of the reciprocal potential for knowledge exchange, general collabora-
tion experience of the partners, and similarity in the degree of popularity of the 
collaboration partners. We also find that firms prefer to cooperate with partners that 
are different in organizational nature and age.
We begin by providing a general overview of basic concepts and principle argu-
ments that describe the relation between similarity in knowledge, experience, and 
their effect on tie formation. After characterizing how these relations dynamically 
coevolve with ongoing collaboration, we present our hypotheses. In the second sec-
tion we explain our methodological approach, including descriptions of the data and 
variables. The third section presents the final results and our discussion of them. We 
conclude with suggestions for further research.
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 Knowledge Dynamics and the Evolution of Innovation 
Linkages
 The Role of Cognitive Proximity, Social Proximity, 
and Similarity in Competencies in the Formation 
of Innovative Ties
The increased orientation to collaboration, especially in research and development 
(R&D), has led to an upsurge of studies analyzing the advantages and incentives 
that are encouraging the trend toward the formation of alliances (e.g., Ahuja, 2000; 
Gilsing, Nooteboom, Vanhaverbeke, Duysters, & van den Oord, 2008; Gulati, 1999; 
Hagedoorn, 2002; Hamel, 1991; Khanna, Gulati, & Nohria, 1998; Mowery et al., 
1996; Powell, 1998). Essentially, most alliances are prompted by concerns about 
access to external resources that are too costly to be acquired internally (Kogut, 
Shan, & Walker, 1992). In innovation-oriented alliances the access to a partner’s 
technology and knowledge-related resources—be they a particular technical infra-
structure or, more important, technological capabilities and complementary skills—
is the primary motive for joint research, besides the sharing of risks and R&D costs 
(Hagedoorn, 2002). Firms, especially those in high-tech industries, are unable to 
generate internally all the resources they need in order to survive the rapid pace of 
technological change (Powell & Grodal, 2006). According to the knowledge-based 
view of the firm (which draws on the resource-based view of the firm originally 
proposed by Penrose, 1959), a firm’s knowledge base, understood as a unique 
resource difficult to imitate, is a key competitive advantage (Grant & Baden-Fuller, 
1995). In this regard firms can be seen as bundles of competencies (Hamel, 1991, 
p. 83) that they have accumulated throughout their lifespan. Because environments 
and solutions to problems differ between firms, knowledge gathered by firms is an 
idiosyncratic property and quite heterogeneous among them (Cantner & Graf, 
2011). Even firms operating in the same industry or market differ in what they know 
and what they are able to accomplish with their competencies. Although this propri-
etary knowledge resource affords a basis for opportunities, its exploitation within 
the firm’s boundaries is limited and leads mostly to incremental, not necessarily 
optimal, improvements (Ahuja, 2000; March, 1991; Yang, Phelps, & Steensma, 
2010). To broaden the knowledge base and explore new possibilities for recombina-
tion and radical innovations, firms depend on external sources of knowledge (March, 
1991; Yang et al., 2010). In looking for solutions to complex problems, successful 
innovators extend their search to the environment beyond their own boundaries 
(Freeman, 1991). The generation of knowledge and innovation thus results progres-
sively from a collective learning process among various actors interacting formally 
or informally (Asheim & Gertler, 2005).
In innovation-oriented alliances rational actors choose their potential interaction 
partners according to the highest expected outcome in terms of successful knowl-
edge exchange and potential innovations. The efficacy of knowledge exchange 
between two or more actors is governed by the degree of heterogeneity between 
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them. The proximity approach, proposed originally by Boschma (2005), empha-
sizes that similarity (conceptually the inverse of heterogeneity)—or, as he calls it, 
proximity—affects the ease of knowledge transfer between actors. He thereby dif-
ferentiates between various dimensions of proximity whose prominence can differ 
from one type of alliance to another. In R&D alliances explicitly conceived to gen-
erate novel ideas and innovations, cognitive proximity might predominate over 
other forms of proximity as the basis for potential knowledge flows, and social 
proximity (also called the strength of social ties between collaborators) might take 
precedence as the control mechanism for knowledge flows.
Understood as the similarity of knowledge bases, cognitive proximity can deter-
mine the degree of knowledge exchange between actors through two central charac-
teristics representing a trade-off in collective learning: mutual understanding and 
learning potential. Mutual understanding is the degree to which different actors 
comprehend each other, and it increases with cognitive proximity. Potential partners 
therefore need to exhibit some minimum degree of cognitive proximity to warrant 
mutual understanding.1 Learning potential has to do with the amount of what can be 
mutually learned, and it decreases with cognitive proximity. The heterogeneity of 
firms in knowledge space is a source of learning effects because relatively great dis-
similarity can increase learning potential and the exchange of knowledge 
(Nooteboom, 2005).
The idea of combining the two dimensions of cognitive proximity—that of being 
a condition for mutual understanding and that of being a source of knowledge 
exchange—suggests the existence of an intermediate degree of proximity at which 
beneficial exchange of knowledge is maximized (Boschma, 2005; Gilsing et al., 
2008; Nooteboom, 1999). A deviation from this level will lead either to increased 
potential for exchanging knowledge combined with lowered common understand-
ing or to increased common understanding combined with lowered potential for 
novelty. Consequently, an actor conducting a strategic and rational search for a 
research partner should, at least theoretically, try to connect with a candidate who is 
similar in knowledge stocks and who partly complements his or her own so as to 
acquire the potential for creating novelty.
Besides the relevance of an optimal degree of cognitive proximity for under-
standing and learning, the second condition for effective collaboration to take place 
is the controllability of the knowledge-exchange-and-sharing relation. It is here that 
social proximity comes in. Social proximity accounts for familiarity and trust 
between cooperation partners, two facets that facilitate the transfer of tacit knowl-
edge and reduce the occurrence of opportunistic behavior. Trust affects the effi-
ciency of knowledge transfer, for familiar and trusting partners have internalized 
1 The concept of cognitive proximity is closely related to that of absorptive capacity (the ability to 
assimilate external knowledge). Absorptive capacity is largely a function of the extent to which the 
knowledge bases of collaboration partners are related (Boschma, 2005; Cantner & Meder, 2007; 
Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). A lack of absorptive capacities tends to result in a sharing of knowledge 
rather than in its exchange, for the partners are not able to integrate the external knowledge into 
their own knowledge stock.
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norms of communication and can therefore improve their control of undesired 
behavior such as free riding (Granovetter, 2005). Hence, the cooperation with 
trusted partners warrants increased reciprocity for their efforts. Frequently proposed 
mechanisms for developing social proximity include mobile inventors, who often 
maintain social relations with their former workplace; the existence of positive 
experience gained in previous collaboration; familiarity with each other before 
cooperation; and acquaintance through a common partner (Ter Wal & Boschma, 
2009). A strategic and rational actor should therefore prefer to link up with actors 
who are already in his or her circle of acquaintances. In addition to cognitive and 
social proximity as means to develop social proximity, Boschma (2005) suggested 
geographic, organizational, and institutional proximity between partners to support 
learning and innovation. For successful R&D collaboration and the generation of 
innovations, we assume that social and cognitive proximity outweigh other dimen-
sions of proximity because the creation of new ideas and the generation of innova-
tion is a costly and uncertain process primarily determined by the knowledge 
involved (Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman, 1998). In focusing on the examination of 
learning dynamics in R&D collaborations, we concentrate our argumentation on 
these two relevant dimensions of proximity. The likelihood of collaboration 
increases with the social proximity and shows an inverted-U relationship with 
respect to the cognitive proximity of the potential partners.
Recent empirical findings underpin these arguments. Despite the differences in 
measuring the proximity dimensions, the positive effect of social proximity on the 
probability of collaboration has become stylized fact in most of the studies on bilat-
eral collaboration and the factors explaining its establishment and the exchange of 
knowledge (Ahuja, 2000; Broekel & Boschma, 2012; Cantner & Meder, 2007; 
Criscuolo, Salter, & Ter Wal, 2010; Gulati, 1995, 1999; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; 
Mowery et al., 1998; Paier & Scherngell, 2011; Powell, 1998; Singh, 2005).
The results concerning cognitive proximity’s effect on the probability of collabo-
ration are less consistent, chiefly because it is difficult to find appropriate proxies 
and the divergence of applied measures. Paier and Scherngell (2011), Cantner and 
Meder (2007), and Singh (2005) found that knowledge proximity had a purely posi-
tive effect on tie formation, whereas Criscuolo et al. (2010), Mowery et al. (1998), 
and Wuyts, Colombo, Dutta, and Nooteboom (2005) gave evidence of the inverted-
 U relationship between cognitive proximity and the proclivity to cooperate or to 
share knowledge as originally proposed by Nooteboom (1999). Consistently, 
Gilsing et al. (2008) and Wuyts et al. (2005) observed an inverted U-shaped curve 
also for the relation between cognitive proximity and the innovative performance of 
R&D projects. By contrast, Broekel und Boschma (2012) observed what is called 
the proximity paradox in their analysis of link formation and link performance in 
the aviation industry: Although proximity seemed to guide the formation of new 
R&D alliances, cognitive proximity especially hindered the innovative performance 
of the observed links.
Scholars have likewise identified factors that go beyond the link-specific prox-
imity as inducers of opportunities for actors to collaborate. Among them are eco-
nomic factors (e.g., accumulated capabilities and resources) and the general 
16 Coevolution of Innovative Ties, Proximity, and Competencies
342
embeddedness of a firm in its relevant environment (e.g., the industry, the region). 
Signaling competence to other actors in the network (Ahuja, 2000; Stuart, 2000), 
both aspects enhance the perceived attractiveness of actors as a potential collabora-
tion partner. In general, firms relatively well endowed with resources, such as inno-
vative capabilities (past innovation activity) or technical capital (technology stock), 
can exploit more opportunities to form links than less well-endowed firms can, for 
potential partners perceive them as more competent than other firms and as better 
able to offer more knowledge and relevant information (Ahuja, 2000). In turn, the 
number of connections that the firm already possesses—its embeddedness—favors 
new collaborations. In network studies the popularity of actors (or centrality as 
defined by their number of linkages with other partners) is highly contingent on the 
degree of their popularity in prior periods. This continually recurring phenomenon, 
often referred to as preferential attachment (Barabási & Albert, 1999, p. 510),2 is 
attributable to two effects. First, highly connected actors have broader access to 
information about potential partners than less connected actors do (Gilsing et al., 
2008). The more connections an actor has, the more information that actor auto-
matically also has about the partners of his or her partners, and the more visible 
potential partners are. Second, potential partners perceive the central firm or actor 
as more attractive than other candidates because the information about the central 
actor diffuses more widely and quickly among a high number of potential partners 
than is the case with noncentral firms. Moreover, a high number of connections 
signals to potential partners a high level of competence and experience in managing 
and organizing alliances, a large repertoire of technical capabilities, and access to a 
broad and diverse knowledge pool (Ahuja, 2000; Gulati, 1999). Giuliani (2007), for 
instance, found that the most central actors in the knowledge network possess the 
most comprehensive knowledge base. The causal direction of this link is not clear, 
however.
Firms or actors do not have infinite capacity to establish new links. The returns 
on the creation of new links decrease with the total number of linkages because the 
costs of managing all the linkages increase as the information benefits decrease 
(Ahuja, 2000; Hagedoorn & Frankort, 2008). Besides, overembeddedness poses the 
risk of becoming locked in, of forfeiting access to novel and nonredundant informa-
tion, and of thereby losing innovative potential (Gilsing et al., 2008; Uzzi, 1997). 
Corroborating this curvilinear relationship for the composition of linkages as well, 
Wuyts et al. (2005) found that the diversity of the collaboration portfolio positively 
influences innovativeness up to a certain optimal threshold. Actors whose popular-
ity and opportunities are growing have to be increasingly selective in their partner 
choice (Ahuja, 2000).
In the context of mutual agreements on collaboration and the search for the opti-
mal linkages out of a pool of potential partners, reciprocity becomes paramount. 
Firms or actors want a return on the effort and resources they invest in the collabora-
tion. Reciprocity creates trust among the potential partners and makes collaboration 
2 Preferential attachment essentially refers to the tendency of a network’s new entrants to be partial 
to connecting to central actors (Barabási & Albert, 1999).
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more likely and sustainable (Cantner, Meder, & Wolf, 2011). Furthermore, the bal-
ance between partners’ invested effort and reciprocated learning determines how 
well the alliance functions and how long it endures. Unilateral learning or an imbal-
ance of resources might result in asymmetric bargaining power and dependency 
(Hamel, 1991; Khanna et al., 1998). Firms (actors) find that their attractiveness in 
terms of resources and efforts is reciprocated in collaborations with others similarly 
endowed. In sociological studies on the relations of individuals, the attractiveness of 
similarity has been termed homophily (McPherson et al., 2001; Rogers & Bhowmik, 
1970). In the context of R&D collaborations, homophily might be driven by the 
search for reciprocity. If so, then actors similar in experience and competence will 
exhibit higher reciprocal potential than will dissimilar actors and will thus have 
mutual incentive to associate with each other (Cantner & Meder, 2007).
 The Dynamics of Tie Formation
Although much work has been done to identify factors that lead to the formation of 
innovative alliances, little is known about the factors that determine the continua-
tion3 of these alliances (Dahlander & McFarland, 2013). Because comprehensive 
longitudinal data on collaboration is difficult to find, most studies on innovation 
networks have relied on static analyses. Conceptual frameworks, too, such as 
Boschma’s proximity approach, are basically static in nature (Balland et al., 2015). 
In addition, the relation between the competence, proximity, and collaboration of a 
firm is characterized by strong interconnectedness. The embeddedness of firms also 
feeds back into the proximity to other actors, influencing their attractiveness as 
potential partners and future collaboration opportunities (Balland et al., 2015). The 
proximity of the partners changes throughout their bilateral collaboration as well, a 
shift that has consequences for its continuation. Both the underexplored coevolution 
of these factors and the evidence of the paradoxical effects of proximity and embed-
dedness make it unclear whether collaboration alliances are finite (develop toward a 
specific date of expiration) and whether one can use an alliance’s continuation or 
termination to indicate an R&D alliance’s success. These coevolutionary processes 
can be captured only by dynamic approaches.
Advances in this direction have been recently made mainly in the research on 
networks by scholars such as Balland, de Vaan, & Boschma (2013), Broekel (2015), 
and Ter Wal (2014). They have developed frameworks for empirically analyzing the 
parallel development of proximity, structural embeddedness, and the overall linkage 
distribution. One of this literature’s foremost contributions has been the inclusion of 
endogenous network forces (the feedback effects of structural position in the net-
work) as an explanation for the probability of link formation other than relational 
3 In this chapter the continuation of a linkage is synonymous with its persistence, recurrence, or 
repetition. It is defined technically as the reappearance of a link over multiple years in our time 
frame of observations.
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effects (proximity) (Gilsing et al., 2008). Initial findings consistently have shown 
that the relevance of different proximity dimensions for the network configuration 
changes over time. Ter Wal (2014) elaborated the role of geographic proximity and 
triadic closure (which is close to social proximity; see Boschma & Frenken, 2010) 
in the network dynamics of the German biotech industry.4 He found that the effect 
of geographic proximity disappears over time, whereas the effect of social aspects 
increases in importance over time. Conversely, analysis of a creative industry, such 
as that of video games, showed that the effects of geographical and social proximity 
were pronounced throughout all stages of the industry, whereas cognitive aspects 
were relevant only in later stages (Balland et al., 2013). The interrelations between 
the various proximity dimensions have also come under study. Cognitive, social, 
institutional, and geographical proximity were found to coevolve over time, but the 
association between cognitive and institutional proximity did not decrease over time 
(Broekel, 2015). At the regional level, Cantner and Graf (2006) examined the net-
work of innovators in Jena over two periods and found that the configuration of 
technological proximity among the actors changed over time in conjunction with 
the instability of collaboration. From this observation they concluded that the very 
process of knowledge exchange depletes the cooperation potential between two 
partners and eventually renders cooperation obsolete.
However, neither the various mechanisms that cause a change of proximities nor 
the association with actions at the microlevel has been sufficiently considered yet 
(Balland et al., 2013). Given this gap in the literature, we adopt a dynamic perspec-
tive to take a step toward describing the coevolution of collaboration decisions, 
proximity, and competencies. By analyzing the endurance of innovative ties and 
relating them to the change in the underlying cognitive and social proximity and to 
the competencies of actors, we go beyond the mere explanation of the formation of 
these linkages.
Two opposite dynamics have been identified in the ongoing debate about the 
effects that social aspects and cognitive aspects have on the continuation and dis-
continuation of collaborative ties, respectively. First, familiarity breeds trust and 
facilitates communication among partners (Gulati, 1995), so building up link- 
specific social capital and the social proximity it entails contributes to the continua-
tion and stability of linkages (Cantner, Conti, & Meder, 2010; Gulati, 1995; Gulati 
& Gargiulo, 1999). Second, an increase in cognitive proximity between collaborat-
ing partners fosters their mutual understanding but depletes the potential for novelty 
and reduces incentive to continue the collaboration (Wuyts et al., 2005). As for the 
development of innovation potential over time, we expect the positive returns of 
increased social proximity and mutual understanding between partners to be out-
weighed by the negative returns of excessively similar knowledge bases. The argu-
ment against long- term relations derives from the need for a diversity of knowledge 
for successful innovation (Nooteboom, 1998; Gilsing et al., 2008). In summary, 
4 According to the concept of triadic closure, actors indirectly linked to one another by a third actor 
in period t - 1 are more likely to establish a direct link in period t than are actors with no indirect 
linkages (Ter Wal, 2014).
U. Cantner et al.
345
repeated ties  accelerate the diffusion of information, whereas infrequent ties serve 
as a source of novel and nonredundant knowledge (Granovetter, 2005).
 Cognitive Proximity
Adding to what has already been done, we unravel the multifaceted concept of cog-
nitive proximity into overlap, reciprocal potential, and knowledge transfer and 
track their dynamics within the evolution of collaboration. Basically, the decision to 
form or maintain a link is continuously evaluated according to the potential gains in 
knowledge and in innovation (Hamel, 1991; Wuyts et al., 2005). The knowledge 
endowment of partners can be considered a pool of potential knowledge flows. For 
these flows to be take place, two conditions must be met. First, a certain minimum 
similarity of knowledge bases, the overlap, is necessary to provide a basis for mutual 
understanding. The ability to absorb external knowledge is largely a function of the 
relatedness of the knowledge bases of collaboration partners (Boschma, 2005; 
Cantner & Meder, 2007; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Second, the exchange of 
knowledge requires potential knowledge that can be acquired because it is novel for 
the partner and not similar to the knowledge that the partner already possesses. The 
implication is that the dissimilarity of knowledge bases is also fruitful for potential 
knowledge flows. Collaboration will be established or continued only if the expected 
knowledge gains are positive.
From a dynamic perspective partners move along this proposed scale of cogni-
tive proximity by increasing their overlap when collaborations evolve. After col-
laboration has been initiated, partners who are able to learn will experience an 
assimilation of knowledge bases that results in both an increase in overlap and a 
decrease in novelty potential (Balland et al., 2015; Nooteboom, 1998; Wuyts et al., 
2005). The positive effects that overlap has on mutual understanding will eventually 
be offset by the negative effects on novelty creation (Balland et al., 2015). These 
dynamic reverse effects have been found in empirical studies on the persistence 
of collaboration between researchers (Dahlander & McFarland, 2013) and on the 
performance of continuing cooperation between organizations (Beaudry & 
Schiffauerova, 2011; Wuyts et al., 2005). At Stanford University, too much intel-
lectual similarity (overlap) of the literature cited in publications by collaborating 
researchers has hampered the perpetuation of their collaborative ties (Dahlander & 
McFarland, 2013). Lack of diversity decreases innovative performance in repeated 
collaborations as patent rates and the quality of patents diminish in long- term col-
laborations (Beaudry & Schiffauerova, 2011), and the less variation a collaboration 
portfolio has, the less likely it is to result in technical novelty (Wuyts et al., 2005). 
We therefore assume that strategic actors who seek to maximize the benefits of col-
laboration for innovation will terminate their teamwork after it has exceeded the 
optimal level of overlap.
Hypothesis 1a The relation between the cognitive overlap of two actors and the 
likelihood of their continued collaboration follows an inverse-U curve.
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Considering only the sheer overlap of knowledge does not necessarily imply the 
full exploitation of learning potential, for the remaining novel and complementary 
knowledge in the partner’s knowledge base is not taken into account (Mowery et al., 
1998). The need to broaden that perspective becomes especially relevant in a 
dynamic examination of collaborations. If the knowledge bases of partners increase 
disproportionally to the overlap, the novelty potential does not necessarily decrease 
with overlap over time. Remaining potential for novelty is a key incentive to con-
tinue collaboration. Furthermore, collaborations as mutual agreements are estab-
lished or continued only if both partners have incentives to engage in them. In 
general these incentives encompass a certain level of reciprocity: Actors want their 
invested efforts and competencies to be reciprocated. Seeking potential knowledge 
flows, actors search for collaboration that they can expect to reciprocate the amount 
of new knowledge they “offer” the partner (Cantner et al., 2011). The greater this 
reciprocal potential is, the more attractive they rate the collaborative opportunity to 
be (Cantner & Meder, 2007). In other words, the likelihood of collaboration 
increases as the knowledge gains of the respective partners approach equality 
(referred to as the increase in reciprocal potential). We assume that the search for 
reciprocity in knowledge gains is also relevant for the continuation of 
collaboration.
Hypothesis 1b The reciprocal potential between two actors is positively correlated 
with the likelihood of their continued collaboration.
Apart from overlap and reciprocal potential, the very process of learning by the 
partners has consequences for the continuation or termination of collaboration 
(Hamel, 1991; Khanna et al., 1998). We define learning as the outcome of success-
ful knowledge transfer, that is, as the successful integration of external knowledge 
into the given partner’s own knowledge stock. This definition includes the possibil-
ity that the newly integrated knowledge is applicable outside the cooperative activ-
ity as well (Khanna et al., 1998). When learning potential has been exhausted and 
the associated knowledge has been transferred, the collaboration becomes obsolete 
to the partner who benefits from learning (Hamel, 1991). Learning also influences 
the power distribution among the partners. An asymmetry in learning might lead to 
an imbalance in bargaining power and dependency structures. Competitive collabo-
ration can be understood as a learning race in which the “first learner” gains a higher 
bargaining power than the lagging partner, who thereby becomes less attractive 
(Hamel, 1991; Khanna et al., 1998). Hence, learning might cause the termination of 
collaboration by shifting the power balance and by decreasing innovative potential. 
In this regard the continuity of an alliance can be interpreted as learning failure 
rather than as success (Hamel, 1991). We hypothesize that the degree of learning 
determines the continuation of collaboration. In line with the cognitive and power- 
related arguments, our assumption is that effective knowledge exchange will 
decrease the incentives to maintain the collaboration. If, on the contrary, knowledge 
is only shared but not transferred, actors will retain sufficient diversity in knowledge 
to benefit from the continuation of the collaboration. We thus expect that knowledge 
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exchange between partners will lead to the termination of their collaboration, 
whereas mere knowledge-sharing will result in continued collaboration.
Hypothesis 1c Knowledge transfer between two actors is negatively correlated 
with the likelihood of their continued collaboration.
 Social Proximity
In the case of the collaboration among researchers at Stanford University, a shared 
history likewise has increased the probability of continuing the relationship 
(Dahlander & McFarland, 2013). Established link-specific social capital seems to 
reinforce collaboration (Gulati, 1995). A reason for this conjecture lies in the effect 
that social proximity has on the degree of comfort that accompanies communica-
tion. Social proximity is associated with trust, the establishment of mutually agreed 
social norms, and the control over undesired, noncooperative behavior such as 
opportunism (Boschma, 2005; Granovetter, 2005; Walker et al., 2003). Because 
social proximity is rooted in experience gained through successful cooperation, its 
supportive effects on knowledge exchange become increasingly evident with repeti-
tion of the cooperation. In this sense, increasing trust could explain the persistence 
of cooperation observed for alliances of firms (e.g., Gulati, 1995; Mowery et al., 
1998). However, the relevance of social aspects might be contingent on the context 
of the collaboration. Cantner et al. (2010), for instance, found that social capital as 
measured by the frequency of the contact plays a role only for innovative outcomes 
of cooperation with research institutes. In a dynamic context we expect that social 
proximity as indicated by the experience that partners have shared through coopera-
tion on innovation will promote future collaboration, all other factors remaining the 
same.
Hypothesis 2 The likelihood of continued collaboration between two actors 
increases with their prior common experience.
 Competence
Other factors that coevolve with collaboration and that are subject to temporal 
changes are the actor’s capabilities, overall experiences, and embeddedness in the 
overall network. Innovative capabilities and experience in managing collaborative 
agreements have been found to increase an actor’s attractiveness as a collaboration 
partner (Ahuja, 2000; Gulati, 1999; Stuart, 2000). As the number of innovative col-
laborations increases, the experience in running an alliance, managing skills, and 
developing innovative capabilities mounts, attracting further potential partners. 
Assuming that the condition of reciprocity needs to be fulfilled if collaboration is to 
be maintained, we expect the likelihood of continued cooperation to be positively 
correlated with the combined innovative and collaborative experience of both 
partners.
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Hypothesis 3a The greater the general inventive or innovative experience of both 
partners is, the higher the likelihood of their continued collaboration.
Hypothesis 3b The greater the general collaboration experience of both partners 
is, the more likely it is that their collaboration will continue.
The embeddedness of an actor as defined by the number of collaborative ties that 
the actor has established also determines the number of opportunities for additional 
collaborations. The mechanism by which the rich eventually get richer explains a 
certain path dependency in the evolution of networks: Central actors tend to become 
more central over time (Barabási & Albert, 1999). This phenomenon is known as 
preferential attachment, or cumulative advantage (Barabási & Albert, 1999; 
Dahlander & McFarland, 2013). This process might be explained by the broad 
access that central actors have to information about potential partners and by the 
high visibility that central actors have for other potential partners (Ahuja 2000). 
However, the reciprocity criterion applies as well. When seeking to maximize the 
benefits of the collaboration, central actors are more likely to find that their invested 
efforts are reciprocated by actors who exhibit the same degree of popularity. 
Moreover, the bargaining power of central firms is greater than that of the less con-
nected actor (Gilsing et al., 2008). If collaboration is to continue, then that power 
needs to be equally distributed among the partners so as to avoid unilateral depen-
dence (Hamel, 1991). Partners are therefore more likely to connect with each other 
and to maintain this connection if they possess a similar number of collaborative ties 
(Dahlander & McFarland, 2013).
Hypothesis 3c The more similar the degree of popularity of two actors is, the more 
likely it is that their collaboration will continue.
 Methodology
In our theoretical considerations we identified three main factors that might explain 
the repetition of innovative linkages in our longitudinal study: (a) cognitive proxim-
ity between the cooperation partners, (b) social proximity between the cooperation 
partners, and (c) similarity in competencies that the partners bring to the collabora-
tion. This section presents the database we used, the variables we created, and the 
methodology we applied.
 Data
To construct potential and realized linkages, we used relational information found 
in patent applications. Successful collaboration leaves a trail in public patent data 
because patented inventions can be considered the output of a preceding intensive 
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cooperative research process (Singh, 2005). By definition, cooperative patents com-
prise inventive success in this context. Although patent data come with certain limi-
tations (see Griliches, 1990; Ter Wal & Boschma, 2009), they offer a rich and 
comprehensive database on inventive activities. While working with patents, one 
must carefully define the scope of analysis in order to avoid the bias stemming from 
unobserved heterogeneity in patenting behavior (across industries and nations, for 
example). To reduce this bias arising from intercountry and interindustry differ-
ences, we narrowed our analysis to patents that were filed by German applicants in 
the field of biotechnology between 1978 and 2010. The biotech industry is charac-
terized by a high propensity to patent and a high frequency of joint research 
(Griliches, 1990; Powell & Grodal, 2006; Ter Wal, 2014). We gathered the data 
from the OECD REGPAT database5 (January 2012 ed.), which covers patent appli-
cations to the European Patent Office (EPO) and the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO). To match the collaborative actors to their respective 
other patents, we used the OECD Harmonised Applicants’ Names (HAN) database, 
“which provides a dictionary of applicants’ names which have been elaborated with 
business register data, so that it can easily be matched by all users” (retrieved July 
15, 2015, from http://www.oecd.org/sti/inno/oecdpatentdatabases.htm).
The use of patent data in our analysis requires some qualifications. First, our pool 
of potential collaborators encompassed all applicants with at least one patent appli-
cation between 1978 and 2010. The influx of entries meant that this pool was not 
fixed over time; it grew from year to year, so we had to deal with an unbalanced 
panel. Second, a link between actors occurred when actors appeared together as 
applicants on one patent document (coapplication). The probability of false posi-
tives in detecting collaborations was assumed to be very small because a coapplica-
tion reduces the applicants’ claim to the patent. Third, it was debatable whether 
continuous cooperation was evident in patent data. If two applicants were persis-
tently copatenting, we assumed that they were still conducting joint research. In this 
sense, we were able to identify long-lasting relationships but may have underesti-
mated the number of ongoing partnerships that did not result in patents. Fourth, 
patents have been established as a measure of technological capabilities (Mowery 
et al., 1996). The suitability of patent data as a proxy for firms’ knowledge stock 
derives from the disaggregate information they convey. The International Patent 
Classification (IPC) offers a standardized and detailed technological classification 
system that enables one to assign the protected invention to a certain field of tech-
nology and to characterize the firms’ research activities by constructing firm- specific 
technology portfolios (Griliches, 1990; Jaffe, 1986; Benner & Waldfogel, 2008). 
5 “The OECD REGPAT database presents patent data that have been linked to regions according to 
the addresses of the applicants and inventors. The data have been ‘regionalised’ at a very detailed 
level so that more than 2 000 regions are covered across OECD countries. REGPAT allows patent 
data to be used in connection with other regional data such as GDP or labour force statistics, and 
other patent-based information such as citations, technical fields and patent holders’ characteristics 
(industry, university, etc.), thus providing researchers with the means to develop a rich set of new 
indicators and undertake a broad range of analyses to address issues relating to the regional dimen-
sion of innovation.” (Maraut, Dernis, Webb, Spiezia, & Guellec, 2008, p. 3).
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Jaffe (1986) was one of the first researchers to use patent data as a proxy for tech-
nological competencies of firms. He constructed the knowledge portfolios as a vec-
tor of patent classes in which firms patented, and he computed the distances between 
technology vectors of firms to obtain a measure of proximity among them. 
Researchers subsequently adopted Jaffe’s approach in using patent classes to show 
a firm’s technology portfolio, technological distances among firms, or potential 
pools of knowledge spillover in the firm’s environment (Benner & Waldfogel, 2008; 
Boschma & Frenken, 2010; Cantner & Graf, 2006; Cantner & Meder, 2007). We, 
too, made use of this rich information by constructing the knowledge portfolios of 
the actors and tracing their changes over time. Because it is unfeasible to approxi-
mate knowledge portfolios of the individual inventor by means of patent informa-
tion, we focused our analysis on the organizational level.
 Sample
The basic characteristics of the sample are presented in Table 16.1. The sample 
consisted of 197 firms that applied for patents with partners between 1983 and 
2010, the period for which we sought to explain links between partners. Because 
our objective was to explain a link between actors by examining their prior patent-
ing activities, we consulted patent information on the 5 years before the actors’ first 
link as of 1983. Our calculation of the variables is therefore based on all patents the 
two actors applied for between 1978 and 2010. To analyze the dynamics of coopera-
tion choice, we considered only the 91 firms that had cooperated at least twice 
between 1983 and 2010, and we observed their collaborative behavior over the 
years that followed the firms’ first appearance in the dataset. When a firm was coop-
erating in 1 year, we paired it with each of the potential cooperation partners that 
were active in the pool at the same time. The pool of a firm’s potential cooperation 
partners consisted of all patenting actors who were active in the focal year or had 
entered the sample before that point (Cantner & Meder, 2007). For all possible 
combinations, we assigned a 1 for each realized cooperation and a zero otherwise. 
Double pairs were excluded. The size of the pool of potential partners was nonde-
creasing from year to year. It amounted to a maximum of 2369 potential partners.
By definition, the collaborations we looked at included the subject firm and, from 
the pool, one potential partner that could be of any type (e.g., firm, university), 
implying that the observations were not symmetric. All told, the 27-year span cov-
ered by our analysis encompassed 321,683 possibilities to form dyads, of which 293 
were ultimately realized.
When we grouped actors according to their overall collaboration activity over 
the whole period or over their all-time partner portfolio (Wuyts et al., 2005), we 
identified 106 firms that had collaborated only once (one-shot), 27 that had collabo-
rated at least twice but with different partners (hop-on, hop-off), 24 that had col-
laborated persistently with the same partner (persistent), and 40 that had pursued a 
mixed strategy (mixed-type). For the purpose of our analysis, we focused on the 
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firms that had collaborated at least twice (i.e., excluding the one-shot collaborators). 
As for the continuity of linkages, we found that 60 of the 293 linkages were persis-
tent and that 138 did not recur. Most of the 293 linkages had been repeated once, 
and the maximum number of times that a link was subsequently observed to have 
recurred was 6.
 Variables
We aim to explain the reappearance of linkages that were established between 1983 
and 2010. Assume, for example, that we observed a certain firm to have cooperated 
with a partner in 1997 and that this link recurred in 1998. This activity is what we 
call repeated cooperation. Assume also that recurrence of this link ceased from 1999 
on. With our analysis we seek to explain why the variable for cooperation (the 




Size of the pool of potential partners 2369
     Cooperating firms 197
     One-shot 106
     Repeaters 91
     Hop-on-Hop-off 27
     Mixed-type 40
     Persistent 24
Partner diversity (collaboration partners of focal firms)
     Minimum 1
     Maximum 17
     Median 2
Links
Possible links 321,683
     Realized links 293
     Repeated links 60
     Nonrecurring link 138
Continuity of links (distribution of linkages across times of repetition, without 
duplicates)
     0 138
     1 41
     2 11
     3 3
     4 3
     5 1
     6 1
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dependent variable) became zero after 1998. To do so, we constructed variables 
based on the cooperation partners’ characteristics that had accumulated in the years 
before the cooperative relationship in 1998. All explanatory variables have been 
lagged by 1 year. Assuming that collaboration was the outcome of a mutual agree-
ment, we derived the explanatory variables (except for Knowledge Transfer, that is, 
TransKnowledge) by matching the attributes of a given firm with those of the part-
ner it selected or was assigned to. In our analysis we have evaluated the mutual 
attractiveness of the collaboration opportunity according to social, technological, 
and experiential aspects of reciprocity. Table 16.2 gives a comprehensive descrip-
tion of the variables used.
 Dependent Variable
The dependent variable, Coop, represents the cooperation between two actors in the 
current year and is binary. It has the value of 1 if there is cooperation between the 
actors as a pair; zero, if there is no cooperation. With our interest in explaining con-
tinuous collaboration and the dissolution of cooperation, previously existing nonre-
curring links (expressed technically by the change of the dependent variable from 1 
to zero) are detected by the variable for common experience (see Social proximity 
between the cooperation partners, below).
 Independent Variables
Cognitive Proximity Between the Cooperation Partners
Overlap
A widely accepted procedure to operationalize the construct of cognitive proximity 
is to categorize the innovative pursuits of the actors in some way. For this purpose, 
the IPC offers a practical, detailed system for documenting their technological 
activities. In empirical studies it is claimed that the IPC is useful for measuring 
technological proximity as an aspect of cognitive proximity (Gilsing et al., 2008, 
pp. 1719–1720, 1723). In keeping with previous studies (e.g., Cantner & Graf, 
2006; Cantner & Meder, 2007; Gilsing et al., 2008; Jaffe, 1986), we, too, adopted 
this resource to classify patent documents and used technological proximity as a 
proxy for the multifaceted concept of cognitive proximity.
To test hypothesis 1a, we included a simple measure used in previous studies 
(e.g., Singh, 2005; Cantner & Graf, 2006). To observe whether a minimum level of 
mutual understanding of both partners was guaranteed, we calculated the two part-
ners’ overlapping areas of knowledge (technically, just the count of the IPC classes 
that partners or potential partners share). To correct for the fact that a potential 
overlap is more likely between firms with relatively large portfolios than between 
for firms with smaller ones, we divided the overlap by the sum of the IPC classes in 
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the portfolios of both partners, using the relative overlap as one measure of cogni-
tive proximity (RelOverlap). We also included this measure as a quadratic term to 
capture the trade-off between minimum levels of knowledge overlap (as a warrant 
for mutual understanding) and maximum levels of overlap (as a hurdle that knowl-
edge redundancy poses to innovation) (RelOverlap2).
Reciprocal Potential
Following Cantner and Meder (2007), we tested hypothesis 1b by operationalizing 
the potential knowledge benefits from a potential collaboration as the relation 
between partner A’s and partner B’s new knowledge that is brought to the collabora-
tion. However, we extended the approach of that earlier study by differentiating the 
individual classes that were new to the partner rather than solely considering the 
absolute number of patents. We counted the number of nonoverlapping IPC classes 
for each actor and took the ratio between the minimum number and the maximum 
number of new knowledge classes. This measure is named ReciPot. It is a continu-
ous variable that ranges between 0 and 1, taking a 1 when the amount of new knowl-
edge that the one partner offers is equal to that of the other (perfect reciprocity). The 
greater the divergence between the amount of partner A’s and partner B’s nonover-
lapping knowledge (i.e., the less reciprocal the gain is between the partners), the 
more the measure of potential benefit approaches zero.
Knowledge Transfer
To test hypothesis 1c, we needed to measure the knowledge transfer between col-
laborators. Citations of previous documents (patents and publications) pertaining to 
the patent have become a favored instrument with which scientific authors detect 
knowledge spillovers (e.g., Griliches, 1990; Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 2001; Jaffe, 
Trajtenberg, & Henderson, 1993; Mowery et al., 1996; Nelson, 2009; Nomaler & 
Verspagen, 2008; Schmoch, 1993; Singh, 2005). A frequent criticism, however, has 
been that patent citations may not imply real knowledge flows, for many citations 
are added by the patent examiner rather than the inventor or applicant.
We took a different avenue and measured knowledge transfer between partners. 
To do so, we defined the vector of a firm’s patented technological classes as its 
cumulated knowledge stock and compared pre- and postcollaboration knowledge 
stocks. We defined knowledge transfer as the appearance of a new patent class in the 
firm’s patent portfolio after the collaboration had taken place (i.e., after the copatent 
had been filed).6 To attribute the portfolio changes to the cooperation, the newly 
added class had to have been part of the partner’s precollaboration knowledge base. 
This measure enabled us to differentiate pure knowledge-sharing (as the pure access 
to knowledge) from knowledge exchange (the integration of new knowledge into 
the firm’s own knowledge base). We assumed that if a class was subsequently 
6 New in this context meant that the patent class did not appear in the firm’s precooperation portfo-
lio before the application for the copatent.
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assigned to single patents, then the knowledge had been successfully integrated and 
was applicable afterward without further collaboration. Used in conjunction with 
this procedure, the binary variable TransKnowledge indicates whether knowledge 
has been exchanged in prior collaborations. This variable takes the value 1 if either 
partner has gained new knowledge; otherwise it takes the value zero. That is, the 
variable captures both symmetric and asymmetric learning.
Our three measures of cognitive proximity—RelOverlap, ReciPot, and 
TransKnowledge—do not develop independently of each other. Their changes over 
time go hand in hand. Figure 16.1 illustrates the dynamics of these three variables. 
Two actors, I and II, hold specific knowledge portfolios before cooperating with 
each other (precollaboration). Actor I’s portfolio comprises ABCDEF; actor II’s, 
ABGH. The knowledge overlap in t-1 is given by AB and amounts to .2, relative to 
the overall knowledge. The reciprocal potential equals .5 because actor II possesses 
two knowledge units that actor I can gain as opposed to four knowledge units that 
actor II might be able to acquire from actor I. In other words, actor I can gain at most 
only half the amount of knowledge that actor II, the partner, stands to gain. 
Formulated differently, actor II can earn twice the amount of new knowledge that is 
being offered to actor I. In this example, the potential gains are unequal. Assume 
that collaboration then leads to symmetric learning in that C and G are exchanged. 
Actor I’s postcollaboration portfolio is thereby enlarged to ABCDEFG; actor II’s, to 
ABCGH. As a result, the overlap has increased to ABCEG and amounts now to .3 
in relation to the overall knowledge possessed by the two firms. In turn, the ratio 
between the potential knowledge gains has decreased to .3 because actor II now 
offers only one new knowledge unit to actor I, whereas actor I now offers three 
knowledge units to actor II. The potential for knowledge flows has thus decreased 
and become more uneven. The attractiveness of this fictive alliance and the likeli-
hood that it will continue have therefore declined. This example illustrates the case 
of knowledge having been efficiently exchanged. When actors collaborate but are 
unable to integrate new knowledge into their stock, then knowledge has only been 
shared and the collaboration is more likely to continue than if they are able to inte-
grate the new knowledge. In this sense, a continuation of collaboration can be inter-
preted as a failure to learn (Hamel, 1991).
Social Proximity Between the Cooperation Partners
To test whether the probability for the creation or re-creation of a link increases with 
the social proximity between the partners (hypothesis 2), we included a variable for 
common experience, CoopExp, as a proxy for social proximity. CoopExp measures 
how often the pair was cooperating prior to the cooperation in question. The number 
of prior research projects with the partner is commonly used as a measure of the 
strength of the tie and is assumed to capture the trust and ease of communication 
between the partners (Cantner & Meder, 2007).




Patents are an approved proxy for innovative activities, for the number of patents an 
actor holds is highly correlated with that actor’s R&D activities (Mowery et al., 
1996). To elaborate on the relation between accumulated technological capital and 
the continuation of linkages (hypothesis 3a), we therefore added up the single 
Overlap t - 1 Overlap t + 1
Reciprocal Potential t - 1 Reciprocal Potential t + 1
Knowledge Transfer t - 1 Knowledge Transfer t + 1
Postcollaboration
t + 1
t = CollaborationPrecollaboration 
t - 1
t
A B C D GE FIA B C D E FI
A B C G HIIA HGBII
Fig. 16.1 The dynamics in cognitive proximity and collaboration (Design by authors)
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patents (not copatents) that both partners owned in the 5 years prior to their collabo-
ration. We regarded that sum as a proxy for their accumulated innovative capabili-
ties (DyadSinglePAT5). To delimit the domain of the variable, we took the logarithm 
of these values. We limited the observation period to the 5 years preceding the col-
laboration of the two firms, assuming the knowledge to be almost obsolete thereaf-
ter and accounting for the depreciation of innovative capabilities. Studies on the 
depreciations of R&D activities (Czarnitzki, Hall, & Oriani, 2006; Edworthy & 
Wallis, 2009; Hall, 2007) have indicated that R&D investment is completely depre-
ciated after 3–5 years.
General Collaboration Experience  Analogously, to capture the attractiveness of 
the collaboration opportunity in terms of management ease, we took the sum of the 
shared patents (copatents) that both actors held in the 5 years prior to the collabora-
tion as a proxy for their accumulated collaboration experience (DyadCoopPAT5). 
Because we wanted to detect the general collaboration experience, we used this 
measure to add up all collaborations except the one in question. The greater the col-
laborative experience is, the higher the likelihood of further collaborations. We also 
assumed average capability depreciation after 5 years and applied the logarithmic 
transformation to delimit the range of the variable.
Popularity Taking reciprocal incentives into account, Giuliani (2007) has argued 
that central actors who are popular (as measured by their number of other linkages) 
tend to connect to similarly embedded actors. We believe that the potential for 
knowledge spillovers might be greater when partners are equally popular and pos-
sess a similar pool of potential knowledge sources (links). To test this relation 
(hypothesis 3c), we followed Dahlander and McFarland (2013) in using the abso-
lute difference between the two partners’ degree of centrality (the number of links) 
in the year before actual or potential collaboration. We called this variable 
DCentrality. Theoretically, this measure is closely related to the general collabora-
tion experience. In our analysis, however, it captures the reciprocity of popularity in 
collaboration activity rather than the pure amount of previous collaboration 
activity.
Control Variables
Apart from technological, social, and competence aspects, we also wanted to con-
trol for additional effects stemming from organizational and age similarity. Both 
variables might increase the likelihood of collaboration due to ease of communica-
tion when the cooperating partners are exposed to the same institutional factors and 
environments (organizational similarity) or when they have had the same amount of 
time to operate in these environments and to accumulate experience and resources 
(age similarity). Organizational dissimilarity—DStatus—is a binary variable taking 
the value 1 when the two actors differ in organizational nature and zero when they 
are of the same organizational type (interfirm collaboration). DPatAge is the 
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absolute difference between the ages of the actors (measured as the length of time 
since their first patent application). Our age variable was also assumed to capture 
the effect of firm size because the age and the size of the firm are usually highly 
correlated.
 Estimation Strategy
The choice of a pair of partners to cooperate was modeled as the probability of 
observing the realization of a link (coopi,j,t taking the value 1) contingent on the 
explanatory variables we have discussed in this section. The decision to collaborate 
in the form of a copatent is a binary one (see Fig. 16.2). We therefore estimate the 
following logistic model (see Kennedy, 2009).
We included all realized and potential i, j combinations over the period from 
1983 to 2010. To prevent potential biases from confining our sample to collabora-
tive actors only, we included all possible combinations between the focal firms and 
all actors who had patented at least once. However, inclusion of combinations with 
all potential actors in the sample (even those that have never collaborated) intro-
duces a source of bias due to unobserved heterogeneity. That is, control-group dyads 
that were never realized might differ systematically in unobserved factors from 
dyads that were realized at least once. These differences in unobserved characteris-
tics might account for systematic differences in the general propensity of actors to 
collaborate. Furthermore, other specific factors that are not observable and that 
therefore cannot be included in our model might have caused the formation of each 
dyad (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Heckman, 1981). To account for pair-specific het-
erogeneity, we applied a random-effects panel model by including a random inter-
cept for each pair. We thereby assumed that the unobserved differences in the dyads 
were the results of a random process. However, this method also comes with the 
strong assumption that the unobserved factors are not correlated with any of the 
explanatory variables. This assumption is hard to test empirically. Conversely, the 
fixed-effects estimator would remove these time-invariant factors but would dra-
matically shrink the size of the sample. This change would come at a cost: The 
number of observations would drop from more than 300,000 to 501. Moreover, 
random-effects estimation allows the model to include additional time-invariant 
variables, such as DStatus. Given these considerations, we preferred the random- 
effects over the fixed-effects model.
Another issue that arises in the analysis of network data is the dependence of 
observations. The observations are not completely independent; individual actors 
might be part of multiple dyads. Consequently, the estimates are consistent, but the 
standard errors might be underestimated (Kennedy, 2009). Because we could not 
make any distributional assumption, we obtained robust standard errors by resorting 
to bootstrapping methods for panel data. We calculated the standard errors from the 
empirical distribution that was drawn by resampling the original dataset in 1000 
iterations. Another form of bootstrapping commonly used to analyze dyadic data is 
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that of gathering the empirical distribution by repeated random permutation of the 
complete adjacency matrix—an approach known as multiple regression quadratic 
assignment procedures (MRQAP). Although this method has proven to be appropri-
ate for linear models with a continuous dependent variable, it is still unclear how it 
performs when employed to analyze binary models (Broekel, Balland, Burger, & 
van Oort, 2014; Dekker, Krackhardt, & Snijders, 2007). Besides, MRQAP has not 
been tested much in panel settings.
 Results
 Descriptives
 Diversity in Partner Portfolio
For an initial overview of the diversity of the firms’ partner portfolios, we consid-
ered the number of different partners firms cooperated with in the years from 1978 
to 2010. Table 16.1 contains summary statistics about the number of partners and 
the continuity of links. As shown by the distribution of actors across the different 
partners (see Fig. 16.3), most firms cooperated with two different partners, the 
median being 2. Only a few firms cooperated with a larger variety of actors. The 
maximum number of different partners in one portfolio was 17. In other words, one 
firm cooperated with 17 different actors during the period under study. For the firms 
in our sample, the implication was that repeated collaboration with only one partner 
was not a dominant behavior.
 Dynamics of Link Formation
Concerning the recurrence of links, we found that 138 of the 293 realized links 
came about just once (nonrecurring), whereas 60 links were repeated at least once 
(the sum of repetitive links was 155). Without double-counting the repeated links, 
Fig. 16.2 The model of the cooperation decision that is estimated to explain cooperation by the 
presented explanatory variables
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we found 198 realized combinations, of which most (138, or 70 %) were nonrecur-
ring. Most (41) of the sustainable links were repeated only once, and the maximum 
number of link repetitions was 6. Unlike the findings reported by Gulati (1995) and 
Gulati and Gargiulo (1999), who found stability in link formation, our first findings 
suggest that firms are inclined to change partners regularly rather than repeat col-
laboration with the same partner. Our findings complement the results by Wuyts 
et al. (2005) and Cantner and Graf (2006), which support the contention that the 
search for diversity of knowledge sources tends to lead firms to switch their R&D 
partners.
 Estimation Results
Table 16.3 shows the bilateral correlations between the variables included in the 
estimations. With regard to correlations between the explanatory variables, we do 
not seem to have a severe problem of colinearity. With respect to the correlation 
between the explanatory variables and the dependent variable (Coop), we find that 
RelOverlap, TransKnowledge, CoopExp, DyadSingle-PAT5, DyadCoopPAT5, and 
DStatus have a weak positive correlation with cooperation, whereas ReciPOT, 
DCentrality, and DPatAge are negatively correlated.
To deepen our understanding of the forces that determine the partner choice, we 
ran a random-effects logistic regression on our panel data. Table 16.4 shows the 
outcome of our estimations for seven model variations. The results for the base 
model, which comprises the two control variables, DStatus and DPatAge, are shown 
in the last column. We found that DStatus was highly significant and positively cor-
related to the probability to cooperate (Coop), indicating that firms prefer to cooper-
ate with partners that are of a different organizational form.
Concerning the dynamics of cognitive proximity, we analyzed three dimensions: 
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Fig. 16.3 Diversity of the partner portfolio among firms in the sample (Design by authors)
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that the squared term of the relative overlap (RelOverlap2) between the knowledge 
bases of the two partners had a highly significant positive correlation to the 
 probability of collaboration. However, we found no evidence of a moderate overlap 
and, hence, no support for hypothesis 1a. When controlling for combined effects of 
experience and overlap (see the column labeled “Interactions”), we found only a 
pure positive correlation between overlap and the likelihood of collaboration. Thus, 
the degree of mutual understanding seems to increase the likelihood that linkages 
will be recreated.
Second, our impression of the search for diversity as illustrated in Fig. 16.2 was 
confirmed by the results of our estimation. We found that firms were more likely to 
reconnect with actors who differed from them in the amount of potentially new 
knowledge than with actors who were the same or similar in that respect. The nega-
tive relation between reciprocal potential (ReciPot) and the likelihood of collabora-
tion indicates that reciprocity in knowledge gains is not a necessary precondition for 
the continuity of collaborations. Our result was opposite to the assumed relation 
stated in hypothesis 1b.
Third, concerning hypothesis 1c, we did not find a significantly positive correla-
tion between collaboration and previous knowledge transfer (TransKnowledge). 
Our results seem to contradict our hypotheses on the relevance of knowledge diver-
sity in the evolution of cooperation. Concerning cognitive proximity, the need for 
mutual understanding seems to predominate over need for reciprocity in potential 
knowledge gains.
Regarding social proximity, we found no empirical connection between the 
chances for cooperation and prior common experience (CoopExp), a result that does 
not support our suggestion in hypothesis 2 that the propensity of collaboration 
increases with prior common experience.
Even though common experience did not play a significant role in partner choice 
among the firms in our sample, the combined overall cooperation experience 
(DyadCoopPAT5) was positively and significantly correlated with the re-creation of 
linkages. That is, choices to collaborate were preferred when at least one actor 
exhibited great capability in managing cooperation. This finding is consistent with 
the results reported by Gulati (1999), who observed the same supportive effect that 
an actor’s general experience with collaboration has on that actor’s chances of 
forming linkages. The importance of cumulative advantages is also reflected in the 
negative relation between collaboration propensity and the difference in the degree 
of popularity (DCentrality). Firms tended to seek reciprocal incentives when it 
came to accumulating experience and building their cooperation capability but not 
when they were interested in gaining knowledge benefits. Our results indicate that 
firms prefer to link up with actors who offer an equal amount of accumulated 
resources. Dahlander and McFarland (2013) found the same negative correlation 
between the difference between the “cumulative advantage” (p. 72) of both partners 
and the persistence of collaboration between researchers at Stanford University. 
Conversely, the common cumulative innovative potential as measured by the total 
number of single patents held by both actors (DyadSinglePAT5) seems rather irrel-
evant when it comes to partner choice. Therefore, we find support for our hypothe-
ses 3b and 3c but not for hypothesis 3a.
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Our findings lend support to the hypothesis that similarity in knowledge and 
accumulated capabilities enhance the attractiveness of collaboration options and 
link maintenance. Nevertheless, firms also seek some degree of heterogeneity in the 
controls DStatus and DPatAge, for the probability of repeated collaboration 
increases when the partner is not a firm or when the partner is significantly different 
in patenting experience. However, these findings can be partially attributed to the 
specificities of research in biotechnology. One reason is that relationships between 
industry and the university are prevalent in German biotechnology. Because the 
innovation process is rather linear, with discoveries being introduced by public 
research institutes, collaboration between industry and the university is an impor-
tant mechanism of technology transfer and thus increases its likelihood. Furthermore, 
the influence of the difference between the patenting ages of the partners might 
reflect another widespread form of collaborative combination in biotechnology: 
young, small companies as the creative engine of joint research and large pharma-
ceutical companies as a source of financial resources (McKelvey, 1997; Powell, 
Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996; Ter Wal, 2014).
In summary, our findings generally suggest that both similarity and diversity of 
actors afford incentives to form alliances. Similarity plays a specific role in partner 
choice with regard to general collaboration experience (DyadCoopPAT5) and the 
accumulation of resources (DCentrality). Actors seek to connect to actors who can 
reciprocate their general collaboration expertise and provide a certain basis for 
mutual understanding. The reciprocity in knowledge gains and the amount of inno-
vative capability seem to play a comparatively subordinate role. As far as organiza-
tional similarity and patenting age are concerned, actors are inclined to choose 
diverse partners.
 Conclusion and Further Research
The aim of this study was to elaborate on the coevolution of several attributes of 
cognitive proximity, social proximity, and similarity in competencies as collabora-
tion between two actors progresses. We have contributed to the debate on whether 
networks are rather stable (i.e., with actors always cooperating with the same part-
ners) or volatile (i.e., with actors changing partners regularly). Our findings suggest 
that firms are prone more to switching their cooperation partner than to repeating 
the collaboration with a given partner. We found no significant effect of knowledge 
transfer and prior common experience on repeated link formation. Instead, we 
found that firms prefer to cooperate with a partner whose knowledge bases and 
accumulated collaboration experience are rather similar to their own and whose 
organizational nature and patenting age are rather dissimilar to their own. We did 
not find evidence to support the hypothesis that potential for innovation and collabo-
ration decreases as the overlap of the knowledge bases increases (Gilsing et al., 
2008; Nooteboom, 1998; Wuyts et al., 2005).
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Our methodology has limitations and drawbacks that one must consider when 
interpreting the final results. First, the degree to which the number of linkages 
observable in our data matches that in the real world heavily depends on the patent-
ing practices among actors (e.g., cross-patenting or cases in which a central institu-
tion may administrate the patenting process and is therefore the only applicant). 
Including only those collaborations that are defined by coapplication might under-
estimate the number of actual linkages. Yet if we were also to take account of the 
connections realized through shared inventors, we might overestimate the number 
of linkages (Ter Wal & Boschma, 2009). In addition, we expect the number of dis-
regarded cases to be rather small because inventor mobility is rare in Europe (Ter 
Wal & Boschma, 2009). Crescenzi, Gagliardi, and Percoco (2013) estimated that 
barely 5 % of inventors change their employer. A closely related drawback to our 
methodology is the underrepresentation of informal ties, for we considered only 
formal collaboration agreements. Prior studies have emphasized the importance that 
informal ties have for innovative outcomes (e.g., Powell & Grodal, 2006), but it has 
been found that formal ties, especially in the life sciences, are generally preceded by 
informal ties (Powell et al., 1996). On this basis we argue that preceding informal 
ties are manifest in formal ties and are therefore captured in the study of the latter.
Second, by focusing on the research of the dynamics in bilateral R&D collabora-
tion, we set aside the study of the effects of the micromechanism on the overall 
network structure. We thereby also opted to forgo explicit consideration of the feed-
back effects that an actor’s position in the overall network has on partner choices at 
the microlevel. We tried to control for this limitation by incorporating information 
on whether an actor was highly connected (central) or rather peripheral and by 
adapting the standard errors accordingly. However, recent research on networks has 
made advances regarding the explicit modeling of endogenous structural mecha-
nisms such as triadic closure and preferential attachment (Broekel et al., 2014). Our 
analysis could be extended by elaborating the overall network evolution as a result 
of partner choice at the microlevel, a selection that is itself determined by similarity 
and diversity aspects. Stochastic actor-oriented models, for instance, allow for 
examination of the relationship between the individual partner choice and overall 
network dynamics (Balland et al., 2013). In this context, however, it is debatable to 
what extent firms can directly influence and are aware of the network beyond their 
ego network (direct connections) (Gilsing et al., 2008).
The third concern about studies that focus on analyzing a certain pattern in a 
specific industry is the generalizability of their results. Application of our results is 
limited, for example, by the appearance of patterns that might be caused by industry 
specificities. However, some of the factors that our analysis identifies (e.g., positive 
effects of overlap, the reciprocal cumulative advantage, and reciprocal general col-
laboration experience) have also been observed in other environments and at other 
levels of observations (Cantner & Meder, 2007; Dahlander & McFarland, 2013; 
Gulati, 1999).
In view of our results and the type of analysis suggested with this study, we have 
taken a further step in the effort to disentangle the coevolution of the proximity of 
collaboration partners and the formation and repetition of cooperative ties. In doing 
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so, we have already taken into consideration factors that go beyond dyadic relation-
ships, factors such as network characteristics. Extending this dimension in future 
research will help improve the understanding of the dynamics of cooperation net-
works at the core of clusters and of local and regional innovation systems.
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